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Abstract: This article investigates the relationships between forms of humor that
conjure up possible worlds and real-world social critiques. The first part of the
article will argue that subversive humor, which is from or on behalf of historical-
ly and continually marginalized communities, constitutes a kind of aesthetic ex-
perience that can elicit enjoyment even in adversarial audiences. The second part
will be a connecting piece, arguing that subversive humor can be constructed as
brief narrative thought experiments that employ the use of fictionalized scenar-
ios to facilitate an open, playful attitude, encouraging a space for collaborative
interpretation. This interaction between humorist and audience is an aesthetic
experience that is enjoyable in and of itself, as the feelings of mirth are intrinsi-
cally valuable. But connected to the “Ha-ha!” experience of these sorts of humor-
ous creations is an “Aha!” or potentially revelatory experience that is a mixture
of cognitive comprehension and motivated (emotional) response. The third part
of the article will attempt to go beyond the consciousness-raising element with
an account of how such possible worlds created in the realm of imagination
through subversive humor can bleed into the real world of flesh and blood peo-
ple. Finally, an example of subversive humor will be analysed.
Keywords: Aesthetics; Humor; Imagination; Oppression; Thought Experiment;
Racism
1 Introduction
The following example from comedian Aamer Rahman will illustrate an appeal
to imagination in a creative, critical, thought-experimental, aesthetic experience
that also appeals to our reason but without the use of straightforward argument.
I will return to this example of subversive humor throughout the article with a
deeper analysis at the end:
A lot of White people say this to me: “Hey Aamer, hey. You get on stage, you make your
jokes about White people, you say “White people this, White people that.” What if I did
something like that, huh? What if I got on stage and said yeah, “Black people are like
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this, Muslims are like that.” You’d probably call me a racist, wouldn’t you? “And I say,
“Yeah, yeah I would”… They’re like, “Well you do that Aamer!… you make your jokes
about White people. Don’t you think that’s a kind of a racism? Don’t you think that’s…
dun dun duuun… reverse racism?” I said, “No, I don’t think that’s reverse racism”… I
think there is such a thing as reverse racism, and I can be a reverse racist, if I wanted
to. All I would need would be a time machine, right? And what I’d do is I would get in
my time machine and I’d go back in time to before Europe colonized the world, right?
And I’d convince the leaders of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Central and South America
to invade and colonize Europe, right? Just occupy them, steal their land and resources.
Set up some kind of like, I don’t know, Trans-Asian slave trade, where we exported white
people to work on giant rice plantations in China. Just ruin Europe over the course of a cou-
ple centuries, so all their descendants would wanna migrate out and live in the places
where black and brown people come from. Of course in that time, I’d make sure I set up
systems that privilege black and brown people at every conceivable social, political and
economic opportunity. And white people will never have any hope of real self-determina-
tion. Every couple of decades make up some fake war as an excuse to go bomb them
back to the Stone Age and say it’s for their own good because their culture’s inferior.
And just for kicks, subject white people to colored people’s standards of beauty, so they
end up hating the color of their own skin, eyes and hair. If, after hundreds and hundreds
and hundreds of years of that, I got on stage at a comedy show and said, “Hey, what’s the
deal with White people? Why can’t they dance?” That would be reverse racism (Rahman
2013). ¹
2 Subversive Humor as Aesthetic Experience
For the purposes of this article, I stipulate that “subversive humor” is a form of
protest or resistance to systemic structures of oppression or an unjust status quo.
It is at once serious in the sense that its content is impactful and significant and
that its motivations are critical, yet it is also playful in that it is open, creative,
imaginative, and capable of cultivating such qualities in audiences—the laughter
invoked is contagious, but so too are the attitudes and ideas. In this way, the
view of humor I espouse is distinct from a relief or release theory which claims,
in general, that humorous laughter offers a means of discharging physical or psy-
 Special thanks to Jenn Marra for directing me to this example. I focus on a stand-up perfor-
mance because it is readily accessible by a wide audience, situated within an understandable
context, and far easier to analyze than anecdotal, spontaneous instances of humor. However,
it would be informative to study in depth the methods and successes of subversive humorists
who engage in “guerrilla” tactics. For some discussions of the subversive feminist group, The
Guerilla Girls, see Morreall 2009, 70, and of Krokidil in Soviet Russia, see Morreall 1983, 102.
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chological tension and pent-up energy. Humor can do this, but it is not the sole
function of subversive humor.²
It is not obvious that humor qualifies as art, especially if one includes jokes,
anecdotes, amusing riddles, role-reversals, and everyday conversational witti-
ness. It is even less intuitive to include subversive humor under the aesthetic um-
brella—what is pleasurable, appealing, to say nothing of sublime, about political
and social protest against oppression? More to the point here, what are the ben-
efits of placing subversive humor within the boundaries of aesthetics for humor
scholarship and/or for those actually suffering under oppression, on behalf of
whom subversive humorists create? The first part of this article explores these
questions.
My thesis assumes that the arts in general are aesthetically, epistemically,
and ethically valuable, following the work of Nelson Goodman: “the arts must
be taken no less seriously than the sciences as modes of discovery, creation,
and enlargement of knowledge…” (Goodman 1978, 102). The successful instances
of aesthetic constructions facilitate the free play of ideas, unfettered by rules im-
posed externally on the experiencer, but also those artworks that foster an ap-
propriate emotional distance from the work that can induce one to pleasurable
reverie. But the sort of aesthetic experiences I am interested in are not “pure” in
Immanuel Kant’s sense, which offer pleasure solely in the perception of the aes-
thetic object. Pure aesthetic experience is sustained for its own sake as we are
not engaged in the experience for any other reason than the enjoyment it brings.
Aesthetic experiences created for the purpose of raising consciousness about an
unjust reality e.g., cannot merely entice the pleasure centers of our brains; they
must also challenge us to see and think differently, and thus they are not de-
signed only to offer an outlet for audiences to “blow off steam.” The fictionalized
settings of some artworks enable us to enjoy our experience even when it might
be directing our attention to something morally unpleasant, but as I will argue
below, an aesthetic experience properly generated can place audiences in an
emotional and cognitive sweet spot—they are not too close to the content that
it cannot be enjoyed (or critically analyzed), nor are they too distant from it
that it has no interest to them, and thus offer no motivation to spend any time
with it.
There are many examples of subversive art that appeal to our emotions but
also foster critical reflection as they motivate by way of imagination, creating
 For more on the Relief theory see Freud 1960; Morreall 1983, 20–37; Roberts 2019, 91–93.
Works of art can be cathartic in the sense that they provide a release, but if this is all that
they do, one may question the efficacy of such a mode of resistance.
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novel ways of perceiving and thinking about some element of our world. On one
account, any work of art is subversive by its very nature. Reminiscent of Albert
Camus’s essay “Create Dangerously,” though without referencing Camus, Stanley
Diamond in his “Subversive Art” opens with the categorical claim that “All art,
worthy of the name, is subversive, subversive of civil society, of civilization” (Di-
amond 1982, 854).³ This is too strong, and in fact, unwittingly lends undue cre-
dence to artworks that are designed expressly for the purposes of maintaining an
unjust status quo rather than questioning it: see Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of
the Will or John Tenniel’s Irish Devil-Fish for just two examples.⁴ These are crea-
tions coming from the top, so to speak, punching down at those without power
in order to keep it that way. Not coincidentally, this punching imagery is integral
in humor, especially the subversive sorts which intend to hit their audiences with
their conclusion/punchline from below.
There is no question that jokes and laughter can be used as a tool of oppres-
sion, as a means to maintain pernicious stereotypes from the consciously and
explicitly racists at WAR (white Aryan resistance) to the putatively well-meaning
millennials who use racist and racialized jokes when out of earshot of minorities
that further perpetuate white supremacy.⁵ While there is not space to fully ad-
dress this matter, it is helpful to note some features common to subversive
art/humor that are not found in oppressive rhetoric, even if artistic. Jose Medina
provides a contrast between the epistemic virtues of oppressed people and the
vices of the privileged that might be useful here. Consider the “three epistemic
virtues: humility, curiosity/diligence, and open mindedness. As they appear
among the oppressed, these epistemic virtues are the mirror-images of the epis-
temic vices of the privileged (arrogance, laziness, and closed-mindedness)”
(Medina 2013, 43). Such a contrast is informative in analyses of subversive art-
works in general.
 Diamond qualifies this categorical claim by pointing out that in some cases, totalitarian re-
gimes, e.g., the artist can become a “lapdog” producing the “official art” of the regime consti-
tuting the “boring translation of a repressive bureaucratic structure” (Diamond 1982, 855). But
he does not tell us whether this fact renders the work non-artistic or non-subversive and why.
 It is true one might retort that what was being “subverted” in that case was the Nazi-fabricat-
ed menace of Judaism. But as I will argue below, subversion implies a confrontation “from
below” or from the “outside” or “borders” or “margins” of society. There is not space to inves-
tigate this matter here, but we can still possibly enjoy some aspects of Riefenstahl’s film, a par-
ticularly unique camera angle, as we might derive aesthetic pleasure from the use of shading or
line in Tenniel’s drawings without being committed to the cognitive content in either one of the
works.
 For an overview of recent research into how millennials view race and racism today (they are
not less racist than their parents, just differently so), see DiAngelo 2018, 47–50.
156 Chris A. Kramer
The use of stereotypes in the jokes created and performed by oppressors is
motivated by the goal of system justification; this is not the case with the sub-
versive humorist. The oppressive person wishes the stereotypes were true; the
subversive attempts to reveal that they are not. The subversive humorist fosters
in themselves and imbues in others a playful acceptance of ambiguity, dyna-
mism, incongruity, and “ontological confusion” (Lugones 2003, 86).⁶ The
“humor” from above in the “winners’ circle (Harvey 2010, 7) consists of ridicul-
ing barbs spewed from a place of aggressive and arrogant ignorance: “In the
same way that the three vices of privileged subjects converged in what I called
active ignorance, the three virtues of oppressed subjects also have a converging
point: a special kind of lucidity, subversive lucidity, which can take different
forms, including critical and experiential lucidity” (Medina 2013, 45; my italics).
It is not surprising that those on the margins of society tend to have an epistemic
advantage in recognizing oppression.⁷
Rather than delve into the morass of defining “art” I will simply offer a brief
stipulative definition of “aesthetic experience”⁸ as I will be using it here, largely
following John Morreall (Morreall 1983, 1987a, 1999, 2009), and then show how
subversive humor fits within that conception, providing possible avenues toward
“subversive lucidity.” For Morreall, a humorous aesthetic experience is one
where an “incongruity is enjoyed for its own sake, the enjoyment of a conceptual
shift by itself”(Morreall 1983, 93; see also Gordon 2012, 63). He advances a ver-
sion of the Incongruity Theory⁹ of humor:
 Lugones also coins the wonderful phrase “curdled logic” which favors dynamism, permeable
boundaries among “worlds,” and the creation of tensions which lay the groundwork for “epis-
temic shift[ing]” among multiple views, thereby pacifying “aggressive ignorance” (Lugones
2003, 18)—this is in contrast to a logic of purity. Lugones’s perspective on resisting oppression
is influential here: “My perspective is in the midst of people mindful of the tensions, desires,
closures, cracks, and openings that make up the social” (Lugones 2003, 5), and that it is a “play-
ful attitude” that allows us to “Notic[e] the tensions from within a logic of resistance [that] en-
ables one to acquire a multiple sensing, a multiple perceiving, a multiple sociality” (Lugones
2003, 11).
 For a compelling case related to racism in the context of the “quotidian,” see Yancy 2008,
843–76.
 Admittedly, “art” fits better for a clever title, but I will be using the broader term “aesthetic”
for this article.
 For an overview of this history see Morreall 1983, 1–59; Hurley et al. 2011, 37–56; Buckley
2005, 3–48, and for a defense of an incongruity theory against competing views such as Supe-
riority and Relief/Release theories, see Oring 2003, 1– 12; Marmysz 2003, 123–54. Other terms
often used as synonyms to define/explain incongruity have been ludicrousness, ridiculousness,
the unexpected, contradiction, paradox, absurdity, something inappropriate or inconsistent, a
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1. We experience a cognitive shift—a rapid change in our perceptions or
thoughts.
2. We are in a play mode rather than a serious mode, disengaged from concep-
tual and practical concerns.
3. Instead of responding to the cognitive shift with shock, confusion, puzzle-
ment, fear, anger, or other negative emotions, we enjoy it.
4. Our pleasure at the cognitive shift is expressed in laughter, which signals to
others that they can relax and play too. (Morreall 2009, 50; italics in original)
I agree with each of these points but with some important caveats. His concep-
tion of “disengaged” in play mode, and related to that in (3), his implication that
humor is not an emotion but a blocker of emotion, both lead to problematic con-
clusions. I will address these two issues in the remainder of this section, begin-
ning with the importance of emotions.
2.1 Emotions and Aesthetic Experiences
Morreall asserts that humor is not an emotion because it is either stifled by neg-
ative emotions, or it stifles these negative emotions. More significantly, he claims
humor entails a lack of genuine concern with tracking the truth or changing the
world and our perspectives of it, which is a key element of emotion. Morreall’s
account, which is in line with the majority view in the history of philosophy, er-
roneously divides the intellect from the emotions.¹⁰ I think it is accurate to claim
that humor can undercut and/or offer an appropriate distance from the negative
emotions experienced by those who are depressed, sick, or buried in existential
angst in the midst of a seemingly absurd cosmos. It is also the case that the feel-
ing of humor can be blocked or dissipated due to negatively valenced emotions
like fear or rage. But neither of these points entails that there can be no humor-
ous aesthetic experience so long as one is genuinely concerned about some as-
pect of reality. Following Mordechai Gordon, “humor is aesthetic to the extent
lack of harmony, having parts that do not fit together, etc. Of course, not all of these concepts are
interchangeable with each other.
 Within the history of Western thought philosophers have (negatively) associated body, emo-
tion, irrationality with women, and mind, reason, rationality with (white) men: “As a conse-
quence of these divisions, emotion and intellect, since they are qualitatively different endow-
ments, come to be thought of as in perpetual conflict, unable to mix or cooperate with one
another” (Marmysz 2003, 144). See also Monahan 2011, 160; Rooney 2010, 224–28; Lugones
2003, 107– 18. This view has had multiple deleterious effects.
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that it arouses the viewers’ imagination, provides them with insights about
human existence, and provokes them to think more critically and creatively”
(Gordon 2012, 66). These positive aspects are unlikely without some motivating,
emotional factors in addition to a reasoned intellectual response.
Morreall claims that emotions in general, but those particularly possessed
by tragic figures, “lock heroes into self-concern and into their own perspectives,
just as they do to us in real life.With emotional states, we tend to act in automat-
ic, habitual, less intelligent ways; and the stronger the emotion the less intelli-
gent our actions” (Morreall 1999, 25).¹¹ But if neurologist Antonio Damasio is cor-
rect, among many other contemporary theorists who regard emotional
intelligence as essential to intelligence simpliciter,¹² then we should infer from
Morreall only that some emotions or some high level of an emotion can counter-
act/balance other emotions. Consider some of the evolutionary benefits of mirth:
humor appreciation is an “adaptive aesthetic emotion,” as Weisfeld puts it,
“humor, like other arts, evolved and is cultivated in order to provide valuable ex-
perience to the receiver” (Weisfeld 2006, 2; Martin and Ford 2018, 19, 32–33,
make a similar case). Like any pleasurable experience, there is a motivation to
continue it or seek it out again to receive that reward of mirth.
This pleasure reward is valuable because it provides us with a playful non-
threatening space in which we can practice for the “real” world of ambiguity,
confusion, and doubt: “Humor gives temporary legitimation to thinking in im-
practical and illogical ways, releasing the ‘adventurous ideas’ that are funda-
mental to creativity” (Ziv 1983, 69; see also Basu 1999, 388). Creativity is some-
thing worth cultivating, and one of the most effective ways to continually
sustain an interest in doing that which is in our interests is to offer rewards.
This rewarding feeling of mirth, like that experienced in play generally, is desir-
 This would be true if he had qualified the statement with “some negative emotions,” rather
than tacitly assuming all emotions gear one toward non-rational, non-critical behaviors. Further-
more, even anger, a negative emotion in Morreall’s perspective, is really only a vice when it con-
notes rage, which is the normalized tendency when used to describe the “dangerous” black
male, or the overly emotional woman (see Lugones 2003, 107–18 for a positive rendering of jus-
tifiable anger when expressed by women who are responding to oppression). So, it is not at all
clear that emotions as such are irrational or completely cut off from reason. An example could
be borrowed from Antonio Damasio’s Elliot’s Problem, in which a patient is incapable of making
real-world choices due to an absence of the relevant “emotional reactivity and feeling” Damasio
1994, 51; see also Gendler 2006, 190–91. Elliot lacked emotional intelligence, something that
cannot be separated from intelligence as such, contra Morreall.
 See Elder 1996; Rooney 2010; and Minsky 1984 and Hurley et al. 2011, 73–92 on the need for
emotionality in artificial intelligence.
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able in itself, but it is also instrumentally valuable as a mode of resistance be-
yond merely laughing off systemic oppression.¹³
Part of the pleasure comes from recognizing novel ways of representing re-
ality, and one of the best means to bring this about is through tapping into imag-
ination. I agree with Morreall here: “In the aesthetic frame of mind we are not
locked into looking at things in just one way.We are free to shift our perspective,
several times if we choose, see things as other things, and even build fictional
worlds” (Morreall 1983, 90; my italics). Solving a puzzle or riddle, for example,
provides us with pleasure and even delight as we arrive at a new way of seeing
or thinking. When the feeling of mirth is experienced in subversive humor, the
audience enters play mode, if it is not already in it, and is more open to challeng-
es to their fundamental beliefs; they are in a position to enjoy and even seek out
further, the temporary feelings (emotions) often invoked by humorists. These
emotions are exploited even when we engage in what we know to be fictional
material: “our cognitive architecture is such that without the tendency to feel
something relevantly akin to real emotions in the case of merely imagined situa-
tions, we would be unable to engage in practical reasoning” (Gendler and Kova-
kovich 2006, 243; my italics). I will return to this point with thought experiments
below.
The attitude that is evoked and perpetuated by humor fosters what Hurley et
al. refer to as “open-ended thinking [and it] use[s] emotions like curiosity, bore-
dom, doubt, confusion, insight, mirth, and the like.” That is, these emotions mo-
tivate us to think (and rethink) about some complexity of reality and help us to
make sense of it.¹⁴ This is an attitude inculcated by the arts generally which “call
our attention to the complexities, ambiguities, and uncertainties of human exis-
tence… In short, aesthetic experiences can provide us a viewpoint on the human
 See Martin and Ford 2018, 33 on recent research that shows how humor can foster positive
emotions: “Unlike negative emotions, which tend to narrow an individual’s focus of attention
and actions… positive emotions broaden the scope of the individual’s focus of attention, creating
a wider range of behavioral response options. This in turn builds physical, intellectual, and so-
cial resources needed to cope with life’s challenges and further contributes to the experience of
positive emotions.”
 Hurley et al. 2011, 81: “Motivation” and “emotion” are both derived from movere—to move:
“Emotions as motivators provide a kind of rationality. They direct our behaviors, and they had
better direct them in a reasonable manner, or evolution will punish them with extinction” (Hur-
ley et al. 2011, 74). In starker terms they claim that “Humor is one part of the emotional mech-
anism that encourages the process that keeps data integrity in our knowledge representation.
This process ensures that we reduce the likelihood of making faulty inferences and fatal mis-
takes.Without a trait like this, a cognitive agent as complex as we are would be practically guar-
anteed a quick death” (Hurley et al. 2011, 289). That’s serious.
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condition that is both profound and liberating (Gordon 2012, 64). The feeling of
confusion or doubt can be uncomfortable, even anxiety-inducing at times. But
there is a strong tradition in philosophy starting at least with Socrates, the
“non-violent gadfly,” in which confusion or aporia can be viewed as a necessary
stage in the progress toward truth, or at least the progression to the state of
knowing that you cannot be as certain as you thought you were. Humor can fa-
cilitate a willingness to remain uncomfortable at least long enough to follow the
thoughts of the wit and possibly reveal our cognitive incongruities. One of the
reasons for this is that the experience of mirth is addicting as it affects similar
reward centers of our brains as some drugs, and it is for this reason the phrase
mirth addiction is an apt descriptor,¹⁵ but the side effects of humor are far less
damaging, in fact, they are positive.
Without noticing that there are contradictions between our ideals and the
actual way of the world, no amount of conscious, willful, egalitarian beliefs
and desires will provide a resolution. The feelings of mirth in subversive
humor play the role of priming the appropriate emotions helpful in motivating
an audience to discover a hidden inconsistency and, if one genuinely holds
the ideals to egalitarianism and truth-seeking, e.g., doing something about it.
It offers an indirect unconventional means of raising consciousness about sys-
temic conventional oppression and can succeed where traditional approaches
have not.
2.2 Playful Distance and Aesthetic Experiences
Humor can elicit both a “funny huh” and “funny ha-ha”¹⁶ response where the au-
dience is placed in a similar situation to those confronted by Socrates.When the
humor involves purposeful ambiguity, or exaggeration and seeming absurdity,
some kind of resolution, or better, some meaning salvaged from apparent ludi-
crousness, is needed in order for it to be enjoyed. This will require an appropriate
distancing from the content of study in order for it to be comprehended and ex-
perienced as amusing, in much the same way philosophers must be sufficiently
 For more on this evolutionary account comparing our addiction to mirth to that of sweets,
sex, drugs, and music, see Hurley et al. 2011, 1, 26, 62, 81–82, 253, 290, 294; Weisfeld 2006, 3.
For one general example, see Jones 2006, 131: “As the mesolimbic area contains dopamine-re-
leasing ‘reward centers,’ these correlations provide support for the claim that finding funny is
a physiologically pleasurable state.”
 See Morreall 1987a, 188–207 on the differences between “Funny Ha-Ha” and “Funny
Strange,” and Hurley et al. 2011, 27–34 on “Funny-ha-ha” and “Funny-huh.”
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disinterested (not uninterested) in the subject under scrutiny in order to step
back from it and view the matter from a wider perspective. This is especially
the case when adopting a different view on a state of affairs entails seeing
from a perspective that might be contrary to one’s own.
The distance that is invoked by humorists comes about as they place the au-
dience in a playful mode where surprise is relished and leads to enjoyment
rather than anxiety. This “emotion of ‘playfulness’ is what encourages us to
spend the energy on the games that constitute play” (Hurley et al. 2011,
80n20). But these “games” include serious tasks such as checking for flaws in
our heuristic expectations whether they concern rules of language, society, or
morality. These playful emotions allow for incongruity to stand out in ways it
would not if we were too deeply ensconced in the details of one frame or too dis-
tant from that frame such that no meaningful connections could be made be-
tween/among patterns of thought.
In aesthetics, the concern might be framed in terms of seeking a “kind of a
compromise between ‘under-distancing’ and ‘over-distancing’” (Walton 1978, 22)
in the construction of aesthetic fictional worlds, especially when the focus is on
morality: “fictions belong to worlds which are different from ours… But why do
we think of fictions as belonging to ‘worlds’ at all—as though they have a place
(or places) somewhere in reality, however remote they may be from the actual
world?” (Walton 1978, 19). An answer might lie in another work from Walton
on imaginative resistance: “There is science fiction; why not morality fiction?
[because]… we are less willing to allow that the works’ fictional worlds deviate
from the real world in moral respects than in nonmoral ones” (Walton and Tan-
ner 1994, 35, 37). In other words, we are capable of thinking deeply and feeling
deeply about the content in an aesthetic fiction because it matters to us, because
it is connected to this world even when we are entrenched in that which is merely
logically, not physically, possible—a common facet of philosophical thought ex-
periment and quite a bit of humor as Rahman’s inclusion of the time machine
illustrates.
In both aesthetic experience and humor, one is interested in the enjoyment
of the experience, and in this way, the artist and humorist alike cultivate what
Morreall calls a “play mode” (Morreall 1983, 89). This playfulness provides the
necessary logical and emotional space for the enjoyment and analysis of an aes-
thetic object. Like play, aesthetic experiences allow one to perceive the world
from various perspectives, and derive pleasure from the creative, imaginative,
and even liberating disengagement from the practical concerns in our immediate
surroundings. But, like the artist, the humorist must comprehend the relevant
elements of reality in its multitude of patterns, and continually be on the lookout
for novel points of view. So, like play, humor is also instrumentally valuable:
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“The main ingredients of humor, surprise and incongruity, together with the idea
that ‘this is not for real,’ should encourage some departure from the constraints
of conventional thinking” (Ziv 1983, 70). Later Avner Ziv expounds on this line of
thought: “Humor is a way of looking at things and phenomena ‘as if ’… Humor,
like play, is an invitation to fantasy…” (Ziv 1983, 72). But this is not merely friv-
olous fancy. Put another way, there are real-world consequences to our imagina-
tive aesthetic play.
The humorist, like the artist, attempts to reward her audience for connecting
or juxtaposing putatively disparate ideas, images, or world-views. In the broad-
est sense of the term, we experience incongruity of some sort, and we like it as it
offers us a view of the world that is not absolute, static, inexorable, or inflexible.
In the next section I will investigate the role of aesthetic distance in humorous
play with ideas: subversive humor that stokes our imaginations and our logical
intuitions in thought experiments.
3 Subversive Humor as Thought Experiment
Philosophical thought experiments are conducted in the mind where pre-exist-
ing mental spaces are employed or new ones are constructed through the crea-
tive priming techniques of the experimenter. This is often accomplished by way
of narrative analogy, especially in moral philosophy, as comparisons to unques-
tionably moral (or immoral) cases are made to highlight the wrongs (or justice)
of a case in question. Sometimes these tactics call on elaborate philosophical
tools that employ imagery, metaphor, and logically possible fantasy (Gendler
1998; Dennett 2013). Many cases of subversive humor are philosophical thought
experiments that frame (or re-frame) an issue so as to reveal hidden assump-
tions, collaboratively invoke shared commitments, moral or otherwise, and at-
tempt to change the biased attitudes of the audience. In this way, thought experi-
ments and subversive, humorous play with words, concepts, and situations, are
deeply connected. Some instances of subversive humor are a species of aestheti-
cally pleasing thought experiments that are “devices of persuasion” (Gendler
2007, 80–86).
Tamar Gendler promotes a mental model account of thought experiment
through which we can learn something new about the world even though
there might not be any novel empirical data adduced with such experiments.
In her words, we are reasoning about imaginary scenarios but with the goal of
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confirming or disconfirming a hypothesis.¹⁷ This understanding of thought ex-
periment can be extended to help explain the potential persuasiveness of subver-
sive humor.We can use thought experiments to gain a better conceptualization of
some aspect of reality, usually by highlighting something that now seems obvi-
ous due to the clarity or compelling nature of the thought experiment,¹⁸ or by
reframing an account of the world that was thought to be unquestionable, but
is now justifiably held under a microscope, in some cases leaving us bewildered
as to how we missed a given point or connection prior to the illuminative thought
experiment.
Gendler notes that “Reasoning about particular entities within the context of
an imaginary scenario can lead to rationally justified conclusions that—given the
same initial information—would not be rationally justifiable on the basis of a
straightforward argument… [the thought experiment is] a reconfiguration of in-
ternal conceptual space” (Gendler 1998, 397, 420). There is an important connec-
tion to imaginative aesthetic resistance to injustice here. Protest cannot rely sole-
ly upon spectacle (see Duncombe 2007, 31), but argument without imagination
also leaves potential audiences wanting. There are arguments that can be
made for the points being illustrated by the subversives, and we might even
be able to reconstruct their performance into an argument, removing all of the
indirect, non-bona-fide, ambiguous language, and imaginary scenarios. But
we run the risk of losing something essential in such a logicist project, akin to
attempting a literal and purely logical translation of a lexically economical
poem.¹⁹ The thought experiment is worked through, as “experiment” connotes,
 There is not space here to give an account of the current debate regarding the nature and
efficacy of thought experiments, but see Gendler 1998, Taylor and Francis 1998, 392–97 for
an overview.
 Ernst Mach, who coins the phrase “thought experiment,” asserts that our intuitions “are
more easily and readily at our disposal than physical facts. We experiment with thought, so
to say, at little expense” (Mach 1972, 452). We might rather say, at an expense that is worth the
reward when it is coupled with humor.
 There is a useful analogy between humor and poetry, namely between humor and metaphor,
a central contrivance in a poet’s arsenal. The wit is revealing something extra-ordinary about
something most people deem ordinary, to borrow from Shelley on the role of poetry (see also
Dennett 2013, 74). To answer concerns that this comparison is hyperbolic, consider that it is
not coincidental that poetry (from poeisis–to create or make through playing with words outside
of rules of conversation) and humor have some overlapping means to their ends, as both often
trade in hidden meaning, economy of language, ambiguity, metaphor, irony, etc. The focus here
is on two areas of overlap: (1) both poetry (primarily through the use of metaphor) and humor
through creative juxtaposition and efficient use of words where much is left unsaid, intend/con-
vey more than what is literally, explicitly, one-dimensionally stated and (2), both can reveal oth-
erwise hidden assumptions that have enormous influence on how we think. Furthermore, both
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rather than reasoned through in the typical argumentative structure. This places
humorous thought experiment in between two ends of a spectrum benefiting
from both “worlds”: pure aesthetic experience and pure logical argument.
With humor we enjoy discovering the errors in our expectations, not direct
valid inferences. Indeed, many instances of humor are structurally similar to log-
ical fallacies, as I will illustrate below, but this does not make them any less per-
suasive—alas, perhaps, for logic professors, but significant for those seeking al-
ternative means of consciousness-raising and protest.
Most openly egalitarian truth-seekers are quite capable of understanding the
arguments put forth by theorists who have similar conclusions as Aamer Rah-
man in the opening bit, e.g., but, due to willful ignorance, an inclination to epis-
temic closure, and the desire to maintain the status quo at some level (many of
the epistemic vices of the privileged discussed by Medina), direct strategies lose
a degree of demonstrability and persuasiveness. Such arguments often fail to
“tap into” the “stores of unarticulated knowledge of the world which is not or-
ganized under any theoretical framework” (Gendler 1998, 415). But a successful
humorous thought experiment, like Rahmer’s, “brings the [listener] to recognize
the inadequacy of his conceptual framework for dealing with phenomena which
—through the contemplation of this imaginary case—he comes to recognize as
always having been part of his world” (Gendler 1998, 412). The historical facts
ticked off by Rahmer, albeit facetiously in the form of counterfactuals, are al-
ready there in our web of beliefs, we just need a way to access them and organize
them—confrontation by direct augmentation rarely has such effects.²⁰
can reveal something of interest and importance about the mundane that most people in serious
mode tend to ignore. Here is an example with humor: “Only in America do sick people have to
walk to the back of the drugstore to get their prescriptions while healthy people can buy ciga-
rettes at the front” (Hurley et al. 2011, 164). This example does not assume universal understand-
ing; that is, the background relies upon specifically North American culture. While humor may
be universal, there are very few if any universally humorous jokes. But humor has the effect of
encouraging audiences to want to understand. Nobody wants to miss out on getting a joke. This
is one difference between humor and poetry: at least in our current culture, one is more likely
unperturbed when one fails to “get” a poem; this is not so with humor. I do not take playfulness
as a necessary condition for poetry in the way I do for humor. Though there is not space in this
article, there is a similar distinction to be made between humor and irony, where only the former
requires the element of playfulness (see Rorty 1993, especially 12– 13, 60 on poetry and meta-
phor; Sánchez 2012, 201 and Lear 2009, 281–83 on Socratic irony especially in the Euthyphro;
and Geertsema 2004 on irony as a consciousness-raising tool against overt oppression in
South Africa).
 Current cognitive science, and Walter Lippmann,whose turns of phrase are more interesting,
offer similar advice: “This is as true of the high politics of Isaiah as it is of the ward boss. Only
the pathetic amateur deludes himself into thinking that, if he presents the major and minor
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The idea that some cases of humor are similar to or are a species of thought
experiment can be found in the works of Arthur Koestler, David Gooding, and
John Morreall, where the latter makes numerous comparisons between philoso-
phy and humor. In brief, (1) ideally both are forms of conversation that rely upon
interaction between/among interlocutors. (2) Both are often concerned with ev-
eryday banalities that the majority of the populace usually ignores, until they see
the oddities for what they are by being confronted with a philosophical thought
experiment or an amusing bit that might spread quickly online. (3) “In philoso-
phizing about something or joking about it, we view it from a higher perspective
than our normal one, [and here is where we do not completely agree]… they are
practically detached from those experiences” (Morreall 2009, 127). (4) Both en-
courage that we look at the world and our place in it from novel perspectives.
(5) Both humorists and philosophers are critical thinkers, open to analyzing com-
mon assumptions, including their own. Finally, “comedians and philosophers
often think in counterfactuals, mentally manipulating possibilities as easily as
most people think about realities” (Morreall 2009, 128). This last point is relevant
to the aesthetic elements of humor.
More recently, Tony Veale argues that some jokes are truncated thought ex-
periments in which “the role of imagination is vital, for jokes ask us to imagine
scenarios that are so out of the ordinary that conventional modes or rules of be-
haviour appear to break down.” Both jokes and thought experiments interrogate
our presuppositions,Veale continues, such “that many jokes are, in fact, humor-
ous thought experiments, in which the theories under revision are social norms,
genre conventions and taboos” (Veale 2015, 69–70). His analysis borrows heavily
from Gendler who claims that thought experiments are manifestations of excep-
tional cases, since these are best suited to expose flaws in our normal categori-
zations. I will also help myself to these ideas, connecting them with the research
from Hurley et al.’s error-detection theory of humor.²¹
premises, the voter will automatically draw the conclusion on election day. The successful pol-
itician—good and bad—deals with the dynamics—with the will, the hopes, the needs and the vi-
sions of men.” Quoted in Duncombe 2007, 36.
 The connections between humor as error-detection device and thought experiment as an in-
direct persuasion device are compelling. Gendler asserts that “by presenting content in a suita-
bly concrete or abstract way, thought experiments recruit representational schemas that were
otherwise inactive, thereby evoking responses that may run counter to those evoked by alterna-
tive presentations of relevantly similar content… exactly because they recruit heretofore unin-
volved processing mechanisms, thought experiments can be expected to produce responses to
the target material that remain in disequilibrium with responses to the same material under al-
ternative presentations, so that a true sense of cognitive equilibrium will, in many cases, prove
elusive… when thought experiments succeed as devices of persuasion, it is because the evoked
166 Chris A. Kramer
We are rewarded with the feeling of mirth for recognizing when a general
rule of thumb or common bit of presumed scientific, political, social, or ethical
wisdom we expect to hold actually fails, and we can now see that there is an ex-
ception to that heuristic. Surprisingly, there is an early instance of this idea in a
joke from Arthur Schopenhauer: “The soldiers in the guard-room who allowed a
prisoner who was brought in to join their game of cards, then quarreled with him
for cheating, and turned him out.” And here is Schopenhauer’s analysis, which
is necessary for us as his presentation of the joke is not superior: “They let them-
selves be led by the general conception, ‘Bad companions are turned out,’ and
forget that he is also a prisoner, i.e., one who they ought to hold fast” (Schopen-
hauer 1887, 277–78). This is one of the examples of ludicrousness, according to
Schopenhauer, in which a foolish action results from one erroneously subsuming
realities under general conceptions.
It is a variety of the fallacy of Accident in which a general rule is followed
and mitigating circumstances are ignored, as the theory, imperative, or general
maxim takes precedence (when it should not) over concrete perception, or
what Schopenhauer implies throughout, reality. So, mirth is “the motivation
for a mind to search out subtle oversights made in reasoning that could infect
the integrity of our knowledge” (Hurley et al. 2011, 12–13). Significantly, these er-
rors are not explicitly pointed out to us by the subversive humorists. To do so
would be to rob us of our “Aha!” and “Ha-ha” emotional and intellectual expe-
riences, and thus, deprive us of the pleasures of mirth in the same way as finish-
ing someone else’s crossword puzzle or answering a riddle intended for another
person would. The audience must collaborate in the meaning-making within the
joke-world, which is a unique aspect of humorous thought experiments.
The subversive humorist is violating rules, but the audience will still be able
to find and/or make meaning out of the wit’s purposeful and playful employ-
ment of incongruity, absurdity, counterfactual, or hyperbolic analogy. Without
at least this level of collaboration between humorist and audience, not only
will they likely not comprehend the content, but they will also fail to enjoy
response becomes dominant, so that the subject comes (either reflectively or unreflectively) to
represent relevant non-thought experimental content in light of the thought experimental con-
clusion” (Gendler 2007, 69). By “disequilibrium” Gendler means that one’s reactions to the fic-
tional story are not compatible to their reactions to the same conclusions, but presented in a
different, in this case, more direct and conventional manner. This is an area where the subver-
sive humorist can succeed in playfully revealing incongruities between one’s consciously pro-
fessed egalitarian beliefs and one’s automatic biased language and action.
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the humor.²² Victor Raskin, who offers a seminal account of a semantic scripts
theory of humor, notes that “humor is a very cooperative MC [mode of commu-
nication], and it is used for productive and efficient discourse when both sides,
the speaker and the hearer(s), operate in the same mode” (Raskin 1992, 87). In
subversive humor, this “same mode” is the playful attitude. This is not always
the case going into a verbal engagement, but once the audience recognizes the
play mode of the speaker this can both encourage them to get into play mode
themselves, and thus openness, pulling them into a collaborative mission of
fault-finding; a task that might otherwise be time-consuming and dull. In addi-
tion, without the playfulness and openness, the task would more likely be put off
or completely derailed, especially if it involves an investigation into one’s own
potentially flawed beliefs.
This might at first appear counter-intuitive, especially as it is a common view
of humor that it violates Grice’s rules for proper communication, namely, his
“Cooperative Principle” (CP) (Grice 1975). When one is following the non-con-
scious and unwritten (until Grice) rules of conversational logic, one avoids am-
biguity, says only what one believes to be true, states only that for which one has
evidence, is orderly, communicates as simply as possible, etc. Violation of these
maxims, it is assumed, limits cooperation among conversants. Raskin and Attar-
do raise the important question, “How can such common examples of linguistic
exchange in humor succeed in being understood at all?” One reason they offer is
that humorous interaction is “ruled by a cooperative principle of its own which
is just as stringent as the bona-fide communication cooperative principle.” The
non-bona-fide communication mode in humor is the “default non-bona-fide
communication mode, or the one which is closest to bona-fide communication”
(Raskin and Attardo 1994, 34–36). That is, we are more likely to interpret a seem-
ingly non-cooperative expression as humor than we are to assume it is a case of
lying or simple nonsense. Raskin and Attardo’s neo-Gricean cooperative princi-
ple for humor lends support, in part, to my account of subversive humor as a
serious effort to genuinely and collaboratively engage others in order to change
attitudes.
The humorist is trying to create cognitive dissonance (or permit the mental
spaces in which the audience can do so themselves), and flout the rules of con-
 See Veale 2004, 422–23; Oring 2004, 18, and especially 55 on the “audience’s playful partic-
ipation”; and Duncombe 2007, 131: “Jokes are active, social things. More than any other form of
communication they demand participation from their audience.” Humor is therefore fundamen-
tally different than many other art forms that might be enjoyable simply because of their struc-
ture, form, design, color, etc., with no comprehension or concern of content. Whether laughter
can be aroused only if one espouses the content of the jokes is another matter.
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versation, logic, and society by relying upon a collaborative effort with the audi-
ence in which they must actively take part in the humor in a manner not found in
direct communication, much less in argument.²³ The more my presuppositions
are made explicit, clearly defended, and rendered consonant with my premises,
usually the better my argument will be. With humor, presuppositions are in-
voked, but often purposely hidden beneath some salient script(s) with which
the wit intends to contrast in the end with a conclusion (punch line) that oppos-
es, contradicts, or is different enough from the initial salient idea. This encour-
ages the audience to reinterpret the entire presentation if they want any degree
of resolution to the incongruity. But, since the default mode for interpreting ap-
parent absurdity found in jokes or narrative hyperbole is to view it as humor, and
we are driven by our attraction to the feelings of mirth, we are especially inclined
to be more open and playfully assess the various possible meanings of the wit’s
language.
But denying that the joking or play-worlds created by humorists ever have
any connection to truth in the ‘real world’, as “truth is irrelevant to joke-telling”
(Raskin and Attardo 1994, 65), Raskin and Attardo, among others, ignore a large
subset of humor, namely from subversive humorists,whose aim is to meaningful-
ly connect a funny fictionalization with a serious reality.We should not be misled
by the term “fiction”; the meaning and intentions in our playfully constructed
scenarios can bleed into reality in such a way that listeners can be persuaded
to see things from a fresh perspective, and possibly be convinced of the view es-
poused in the imaginative thought experiments of the subversive humorist. To
claim, as Raskin and Attardo do, that all joke-worlds are unconcerned with
truth, amounts to believing that all thought experiments have no connection
to the real world, due to the violations of accepted rules and patterns in the log-
ically possible realms.
The range of amusing incongruities and exceptions to general rules is quite
broad, but some of those most related to the freedom of thought regarding
norms, customs, and the social, intellectual, and ethical expectations include
playing with points of view, categories, logical rules, linguistic rules, and the
 There is an insightful and memorable Buddhist parable that might help make my point here,
which I will paraphrase: Two monks who had taken vows of chastity, saw a woman in need of
crossing a river. One monk silently (the monks were not allowed to speak until dinner) carried
her across. Later, the other monk asked him, “Why did you touch that woman? We are not al-
lowed such things.” The first monk replied: “I set her down on the other side of the river
hours ago. Why are you still carrying her?” If we read this from a purely logical standpoint,
we might exclaim “Equivocation! Those are clearly two different senses of ‘carrying.’” But of
course, this would entirely miss the point.
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pragmatic rules of conversation, for example. Many of these overlap or are sub-
sumed within each other, but each includes the development of novelty-seeking
which is uncomfortable for the dogmatic serious person who seeks complacency
in the familiar, or that which is congruous with his preconceptual background.
When a playful attitude is fostered in aesthetically assembled thought experi-
ments, we are more likely to allow our potentially inconsistent intuitions into
consciousness so that we can amend them if necessary. Such a move is essential
to engage in social change in the actual world.
4 Subversive Humor and Imaginative Contagion
One of the most interesting forms of subversive humor is the sort that is com-
pletely fabricated. That is, it is made up, invented, a creation from the mind of
the wit or an act of fiction. Such acts of subversive humor are adult forms of play-
ful pretending but can be about very serious matters, such as racism, sexism, ho-
mophobia, and oppression. In many cases in which counterfactuals are em-
ployed, a purely historical “what if” account is envisioned, as with Rahman’s
joke, but such hypothetical thinking can also project forward through imagining
what would have to be the case for a desired state to be actualized.²⁴
The “fictions” engaged in both subversive humor and thought experiments
are not intended to remain solely internally consistent within the imaginative
construction, having no practical implications for the real world corresponding
to the joke-worlds. Rahman’s performance is an instance of a thought experi-
ment in which much of the content is not intended to be taken literally, and
yet our intuitions are that he is motivated to convince us that (some of) his
ideas are true. In Gendler’s words, he wishes to “demonstrate” to his audience
specific conclusions that are “novel justified true beliefs about the [social]
world” (Gendler 1998, 411) even though he clearly does not intend for us to sus-
pend our disbelief about the technological reality of time machines.
But a concern with any aesthetic work that makes things up, as with jokes
and thought experiments, is “How can versions of nothing thus participate in
the making of [or connection to] actual worlds?” (Goodman 1978, 103) as fictional
 This kind of imaginative thought has commonly been practiced among athletes who, for ex-
ample, “practice” shooting free throws in the “laboratory of their minds” resulting in compara-
ble improvements to those who actually practice on the physical court. It is also invoked with
subversive humorists as they imagine alternate realities in which they are no longer oppressed.
For the humorous thought experiments of the marginalized, see Gilbert 2004, 178 and Duncombe
Chapter 7 Dreampolitik; for the efficacy of imagination in protest, see Harvey 2010, 13–27.
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characters such as Don Quixote (his example) do not have any referents in the
real world. This brings us to a question raised by Walton: “What relations can
hold between the real world and fictional worlds?” (Walton 1978, 11) My argu-
ment assumes, expanding on Walton, that there is a permeable membrane be-
tween fictional joke-worlds and the real world: “The barrier between worlds is
not airtight, however. There are epistemological holes in it. We know a great
deal about what happens in fictional worlds… [and more to the point here]
Along with our epistemological access to fictional occurrences goes a capacity
to be affected by them. We respond to what we know about fictional worlds in
many of the ways that we respond to what we know about the real world—or
at least it seems that we do” (Walton 1978, 12). We do, and it is a feat of imagi-
nation that should not be underestimated.
Thought experiments as aesthetic worlds facilitate a reappraisal of our con-
cepts not just by providing a jolt to our cognitive structures, but through stoking
our emotions.²⁵ Gendler makes this point regarding the role of imagination, al-
beit in non-aesthetic cases, that when engaged in imaginative rehearsal of a cer-
tain practice, we can arrive at new beliefs that would otherwise be beyond our
reach if we relied on reasoning in a disinterested manner. Her point, borrowing
from Damasio’s research on “somatic markers” which encode intelligent re-
sponses to emotionally salient data whether from one’s immediate environment
or a make-believe scenario, is that direct confrontation with an issue, assuming
deductive or inductive inferences as the only means to reach a belief is often in-
sufficient. This is the case with patients trying to overcome neuroses, or those
afraid of public speaking or flying on an airplane. It is important to note that
in many of these cases if asked whether they believed flying really is dangerous,
e.g., the person in question would explicitly state they do not believe it is, as
they are aware of the numerous statistics which reveal the greater likelihood
of being stung and killed by a bee than dying in a plane crash. Nevertheless,
the greater fear of flying remains. But this fear, which seems somewhat unre-
sponsive to reasons in direct fashion, is responsive to mental imagery in fiction-
alized constructions. This is also the case with implicit biases that are less-than-
reasons-responsive, that require “sub-rational mechanisms” to unearth and
amend them.
 Veale offers a similar view: “A strong emotive basis is also important in nurturing the desired
response to a thought experiment, much as it is in humour, which often seeks a visceral reaction
to a joke” (Veale 2015, 73), and “Thought experiments with a pronounced interpersonal dimen-
sion are more likely to engage the social instincts of a listener and achieve both an emotive and
an intellectual effect” (Veale 2015, 82).
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How can imaginative experimentation in thought make actual differences in
the real world? Here is Gendler: “The cognitive and behavioral manifestations as-
sociated with imaginative contagion are not marked as explicit episodes of pre-
tense. Instead, they are actual responses to imagined content. Imaginative con-
tagion occurs when source-indifferent features of our mental architecture
process merely imagined input in the same way that nonimaginary input
would have been processed, despite our recognition that the content in question
is not reality reflective” (Gendler 2006, 188). So, we respond with real emotion
and this-worldly ways even when we know the information before us is pretense
in part or whole. This gives the author or humorous thought-experimenter much
more freedom of imagination to stretch conventional thinking, instilling in audi-
ences a “playful attitude” that allows us to “Notic[e] the tensions from within a
logic of resistance [that] enables one to acquire a multiple sensing, a multiple
perceiving, a multiple sociality” (Lugones 2003, 11). Without this, other social
perspectives are ignored.
The realm of imagination is not confined to the real world of literal truth, or
what we take the real world’s literal truth to be, and this is a good thing if one of
our aims is to change some aspect of the real world. But this requires a deft in-
terweaving of fact and fiction where our minds are not confined to the “REAL/
HERE/NOW/ME/PRACTICAL” (Morreall 2009, 32), the “serious” realm of emo-
tions, in Morreall’s sense, for if they were, we would have very few chances of
survival. Looking into the future, a time not yet, hence, in a non-trivial sense,
a possible world of our imaginations, allows us to creatively and critically reflect
on where we have been, what is the case here and now, and what we wish and
even dream for (Duncombe 2007, 176–83) in a future state. This requires motivat-
ing emotions,²⁶ contra Morreall, and not merely ratiocination.
A well-constructed thought experiment is in many ways akin to what Nelson
Goodman calls “worldmaking.” But “Worldmaking as we know it always starts
from worlds already on hand; the making is a remaking” (Goodman 1978, 6).
The possible worlds created by subversive humorists attempt a “reorganization
of our familiar world” (Goodman 1978, 104), playing with thought, ideas, con-
 Admittedly, there are cases in which there is an affective component to a humorous incon-
gruity in which the degree of mirth might be increased due to feelings of animosity against the
object of the humor. A separate article would be needed to adequately address this issue, but I
would argue that if all that is involved are feelings of superiority over another, and no incongrui-
ty invoking laughter, then we are left with pure ridicule, not humor. This would be the case
whether it comes from above or below, but due to the power differentials, it is always more
harmful when it showers down from the “winner’s circle.” For more on the way an affective el-
ement might enhance amusement, see Roberts 2019, 103–08.
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cepts, words giving license to an audience to do the same as they collaboratively
help to make meaning out of what might otherwise be considered non-bona-fide,
ambiguous, made-up nonsense. The humorous wit can “take, and unmake and
remake and retake familiar worlds and recast them in remarkable and sometimes
recondite but eventually recognizable—that is, re-cognizable—ways” (Goodman
1978, 104–5). Subversive humor, like all humor, relies upon cognitive shifting
and reframing of all sorts of rules, but instead of resenting, distressing, or feeling
traumatized by the frame-shifting, we enjoy it so much that we even pay people
to help facilitate such oscillations, and this can be the case even when the shift-
ing entails a re-evaluation of our own cherished (and preidentified) rules, heu-
ristics, and conventional categorizations: “We laugh not just because categories
are subverted and their boundaries shown to be fuzzier than previously believed,
but because there are social consequences of this subversion that we find psy-
chologically satisfying” (Veale 2015, 88). These are real-world effects produced
by thought experiments piquing our imaginations.
5 Analysis of “Reverse Racism”
Returning to the opening joke from Aamer Rahman, it is aesthetic in the above
sense due to the creative, pleasurable experience, placing us in a play mode
which invokes the appropriate emotions driving curiosity and openness to sur-
prise. These allow us to maintain focus even as we might sit a bit uncomfortably
through a reversal of actual white supremacist history, which acts as a not-so-
subtle reminder of the reality. In play mode we are primed to be at the right dis-
tance, and can follow along with the creative constructions and even add input
collaboratively when needed.
It is not easy to say something original, interesting, creative, imaginative, rel-
evant, insightful, and amusing all at the same time, especially when the content
concerns hotly contested matters of race and oppression. This bit hits all of those
markers while exploding the historical and conceptual confusion inherent in the
obfuscating phrase “reverse racism.” Rahmer violates our expectations when he
says “I can be a reverse racist,” but once we recognize he has maneuvered us
into a “what if” story, a counterfactual, we might be able to predict the conclu-
sion. Nevertheless, we are compelled to tarry along with enjoyment until the
punchline hits, and we can see what we likely had an inkling of all along²⁷ be-
 Recall Shelly’s comment on poetry making the ordinary appear extraordinary. The comedian,
like many philosophical thought-experimenters, “exaggerates or distorts his observations as a
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cause we possess the relevant intuitions—it is the case that anyone might be the
victim of prejudice or discrimination; but his implied point, one we collaborate
with in filling in, is that it is prejudice when coupled with historical power over
all of the relevant systems of governance, law, education, employment, housing,
military, health, etc., that sustains racism.
Logically, Rahman’s piece loosely fits a form of reductio ad absurdum: sup-
pose “reverse racism” were a real thing.What would have to be the case to make
that so? Well, it would take a time machine and upending a central facet of West-
ern history. The absurd conclusion is then something rather unwieldy when put
in bona-fide non-humorous language: “reverse racism is possible when the
marginalized person directs her jokes against a white hegemonic male, for in-
stance, when that marginalized person belongs to a group that has power over
all or most of the relevant systems of governance and social interaction.” The
contradiction hits us in the face with “subversive lucidity”: the marginalized, op-
pressed, powerless person must be the dominant oppressor from the center.²⁸
She cannot be both simultaneously.
This is an example of an aesthetically pleasing thought experiment that calls
to our attention something that is likely obvious to many minorities who have to
see and understand these issues as a matter of survival.²⁹ Focused attention to
racism submerged within common experiences is needed especially with the
re-election of the one and only black President of the United States. This is be-
cause there is now an environment that, to the privileged at least, appears to be
“post-racial”³⁰ and thus devoid of “real” racism among the majority, and claims
participant observer talking to people in his own society about the familiar cultural rules and
behavior patterns in their and his own society. The audience may hear their own behavior de-
scribed as if it is an alien culture in the sense that they knew that information all along but no
one ever said it like that to them before. However, even though the comedian and his audience
share culture, part of the cultural knowledge with which they operate is tacit (that is, hitherto
unspoken)” (Koziski 1984, 61; my italics).
 There are issues with intersectionality here, as power can be complex. Richard Pryor used
subversive humor against a racist system, but at the same time, he had power vis-a-vis Chinese
immigrants and women and he often denigrated both in his performances. See Watkins 1999,
558–60.
 “I think that most of us who are outside the mainstream of, for example, the United States
dominant construction or organization of life are ‘world’ travelers as a matter of necessity and of
survival” (Lugones 2003, 88). But survival in this sense relies upon a non-solipsistic world-view.
Unlike the privileged, the marginalized do not have the luxury of assuming theirs is the only
valid perspective on reality.
 For instance, see Adam Serwer’s piece in Mother Jones on the latest Supreme Court decision
on key sections of the Voting Rights Act (2013). See also DiAngelo 2018.
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to the contrary constitute cynically “playing the race card,”³¹ or engaging in “re-
verse racism.” There are even some who claim that the new oppressed class is
the white, heterosexual, Christian, male. They are mistaken.³²
6 Conclusion
One of the features of Rahmer’s example that distinguishes it from a bad thought
experiment is its “ability to direct the reader’s attention to inadequacies in her
conceptual scheme that she herself recognizes immediately, as soon as they
are pointed out to her”(Gendler 1998, 413; my italics). It is true the comedian is
directing our attention, but only in the fashion of offering helpful hints and
openings to find the flaws for ourselves; he is not giving all of the relevant
data (if even possible) all at once, doing all the work. The audience must become
participants in the fault-finding process with the subversive humorist in a man-
ner not found in direct logical argument, bona-fide unambiguous protest.³³ The
entire bit is less than three minutes, even though he successfully navigates a
counter-historical narrative, a “what if” story, that is a reversal of the actual his-
tory of white supremacy. His economy of language leaves openings for his audi-
ence to fill in collaboratively the details necessary to achieve his punchline (con-
 Somewhat incongruously, there is also the claim made by the same people in this post-racial
society that President Obama has only been re-elected because he is black! See The Colbert Re-
port 2012. See also Monahan 2011, 5, referencing the comments of the same George Will that the
election of a black president has rendered race irrelevant. The inconsistency of Will’s claims is
glaring, especially when humorously re-presented by Stephen Colbert. See also Duncombe 2007,
161, quoting the Onion: “‘on the occasion of Rosa Parks’s death, as her body lay in wait in the
Capitol Rotunda and President Bush placed a wreath upon her casket, “Now We Can Finally Put
Civil Rights Behind Us.”
 See Cassino 2016. One can be wrong about where one lies on the socio-political spectrum
and about how much power one actually possesses. The facts matter. See Munin 2012 for the
recent statistics on the wide disparities in access for black children on all relevant dimensions
from housing, healthcare, education, healthy food, healthy air and water, to unequal treatment
in the justice system. The very point of Rahman’s reverse racism bit is that racism and oppression
require systematic power that, for example, white, heterosexual, Christian, males still possess in
virtually ALL of the sectors mentioned above.
 “Humor is just one way that politicos have figured out how to create a spectacle that engages
people, making them into active participants (“livers”) even in the very spectacles they enjoy
just watching” (Duncombe 2007, 132–33).
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clusion). He gets us to visualize a situation in order to carry out an operation and
see what happens in our minds, from which we draw a conclusion.³⁴
This collaboration places much of the task of meaning and understanding
on the audience, which means that they “own” the attitude change, to the extent
that it occurs, or that they are co-authors of it, which can help alleviate the anxi-
ety and discomfort due to a shift in perspectives. When one is playful one can
discern the intentions of a speaker in ways not available in the default serious
mode; meanings are not absolute and fixed, but contingent, as are the hierarch-
ical and oppressive structures resisted by the subversive humorist.
Covert “civilized” oppression (Harvey 1999) causes psychological harms and
results in legal and economic exclusion every bit as real as overt, but caused by
concealed and systemic mechanisms such as implicit biases and stereotypes.
Since many of these biases are not consciously reasoned into one’s system of be-
liefs, and since they are notoriously difficult to bring to consciousness and dis-
lodge via direct, logical confrontation, some other creative means of resistance
should be considered. A less conventional and more imaginative approach is
needed, but one that does not rely upon traditional rule-following, one-dimen-
sional thinking, nor one that attacks the status quo merely to delight in a
pure aesthetic experience. Subversive humor employs aesthetics and logic, play-
fulness and seriousness, emotion and reason. To the extent that it works for op-
pressed people toward establishing psychological distance, encouraging disin-
terested third-party bystanders (to the extent that there are such beings) to
recognize their struggle, and possibly even get the oppressors to recognize
them as equal human beings, subversive humor is significantly efficacious to-
ward combating oppression.³⁵
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